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Testing the Pecking Order Theory and the Signaling Theory for 
Farm Businesses   
Abstract   
Numerous empirical studies in the finance field have tested many theories for 
firms’ capital structure. Under the assumption of asymmetric information, the pecking 
order theory proposes the financing order for farm businesses, which implies a 
negative relationship between their cash flow and leverage. Meanwhile, the signaling 
theory suggests a farms’ financing strategy, meaning high quality farms prefer to 
facilitate their capital rising by sending diverse signals to potential lenders. Could 
these capital structure theories be applied for farm businesses?   
This paper tests the applicability of the pecking order theory and the signaling 
theory for farm businesses. The results show that farm businesses not only follow the 
pecking order theory but also the signaling theory. In addition, unlike corporate firms 
who can choose high leverage as financing signals, farm businesses mainly depend on 
their large size and good historical operation records to facilitate investment 
financing.  
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Testing the Pecking Order Theory and the Signaling Theory for Farm 
Businesses 
Extensive empirical work has been completed in finance field on the theories of 
firms’ capital structure. Application of these theories to farm businesses, however, is 
limited.    Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) test for the presence of financial constraints 
on U.S. farms and found that the sensitivity of investments to changes in net worth is 
greater during financial stress periods.    Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) find that 
credit constraints were more important during the 1980s farm crisis and for farms 
with weaker internal finance positions.    Jensen, Lawson, and Langemeier (1996) 
similarly observe the significant effects of internal funds on farm investments.    Barry, 
Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000), test the applicability of the pecking order and partial 
adjustment theories for farm businesses.    They found that farms adjust to long-run 
financial targets for equity, debt, and leasing, but that additional financing needs 
follow a pecking order that is stronger for farms with greater asymmetric information 
problems. Following Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, our study expands the theory 
content by considering the potential effects of the pecking order and signaling theory 
on the capital structure for farm businesses.   
In finance, the signaling theory and the pecking order theory both concern the 
relationship between a firm's financial leverage and cash flow under asymmetric 
information. Signaling theory suggests a positive relationship, while pecking order 
behavior implies a negative relationship. These contradictory theoretical implications 
are both supported in the empirical.    Baskin (1989) and Wilbricht (1989), Jensen, 
Solberg, and Zorn (1992), Claggett (1991) find evidence supporting the pecking order   4
hypothesis. Sunder and Myers (1999) test a panel of 157 firms from 1971 to 1989 and 
find statistically significant support for the pecking order theory. Considering the 
capital structure in the signaling setting, Ravid and Sarig (1991) find firms signal their 
quality by the optimal combination of dividends and leverage. They predict that 
“better firms to be highly leveraged and to pay higher dividends than lower quality 
firms.” This assertion is supported by many empirical studies (e.g. Aharony and 
Swary (1980), Masulis (1980) that document positive abnormal returns follow either a 
dividend increase or an increase in leverage). Shenoy and Koch (1995) reconciled 
signaling theory and pecking order theory by proposing that signaling theory acts 
intertemporally while pecking order theory focuses on the contemporaneous 
relationship between cash flow and leverage. Is this distinction applicable for farm 
businesses? According to signaling theory, farmers and lenders have asymmetric 
information regarding farm's investment prospects. Farm owners then attempt to 
convey to lenders their good expectations of future performance through diverse 
signals, which can be higher leverage or rich accumulated assets. Lenders judge the 
truth of these signals and then issue loans. If high leverage can also works as 
financing signal for farm businesses, financed farms should have a higher leverage 
level which is connected with contemporaneous investments. Since the payoffs from 
the investments cannot be realized immediately due to the long production cycle in 
agriculture, the relevant signaling should imply a positive relationship between farms’ 
current leverage and future cash. Pecking order financing suggests that farms with 
given investment opportunities in any given period will first rely on available cash   5
flow to meet financing needs. After cash is depleted, farmers prefer to utilize debt 
financing compare to issuing equity, which implies cash flow and leverage should be 
negatively related and simultaneously determined. 
The purposes of our study are to econometrically test whether the farm 
businesses follow the pecking order theory as well as the signaling theory. First, we 
test whether leverage and cash flow are negatively related during the same time 
period, which is implied by pecking order theory. Then we test whether farm 
businesses follow the signaling theory and whether the high leverage is used by farm 
businesses as well as other signals (such as good historical income and profitability) 
to facilitate their investment financing.   6
Relevant Literature 
Numerous theories on capital structure in finance have evaluated Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)’s landmark suggesting condition under which capital-structure is 
irrelevant to the value of firm. Agency theory, market timing theory, inertia theory all 
developed to reflect characteristics of firm’s capital structure. Our paper mainly 
concerns financing strategy and decisions, so the signaling theory and the pecking 
order theory will be focus on. 
The Pecking Order Theory   
The pecking order theory of capital structure is among the most influential 
theories of corporate leverage. Originally developed by Myers-Majluf (1984), it 
considers the role of information asymmetries (with regard to presently held assets 
and investment opportunities) between firms and capital markets. According to 
Myers-Majluf, firms use internal funds that are less costly than external funds. When 
outside funds are necessary, firms prefer debt to equity because of lower information 
costs associated with debt issues, while equity is rarely issued. Later, these ideas were 
refined into testable predictions and confirmed by Vogt (1994) who finds that internal 
funds have an important influence in firm’s investment decisions; pecking order 
behavior is most pronounced in firms that have low long-run dividend payout 
policies. 
The Signaling Theory 
The concept of signaling was first studied in the context of job and product 
markets by Akerlof and Arrow and was developed into signal equilibrium theory by   7
Spence (1973), which says a good firm can distinguish itself from a bad firm by 
sending a credible signal about its quality to capital markets. The signal will be 
credible only if the bad firm is unable to mimic the good firm by sending the same 
signal. If the cost of the signal is higher for the bad type than that of the good type 
firm, the bad type may not find it worthwhile to mimic, and so the signal could be 
credible. Ross (1977) shows how debt could be used as a costly signal to separate the 
good from the bad firms. Under the asymmetric information between management 
and investors, signals from firms are crucial to obtain financial resources. Ross 
assumes that managers (the insiders) know the true distribution of firm returns, but 
investors do not. Signaling of higher debt by managers then suggests an optimistic 
future and high quality firms would use more debt while low quality firms have lower 
debt levels. In this way, a good firm can separate itself by attracting scrutiny while the 
bad firm will not mimic because the bad firm will not want to be discovered.   
Two types of signaling inside information have been suggested: one is the costly 
signaling equilibrium discussed by Spence (1973), Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross 
(1977) and Talmor (1981) etc., the other is the costless signaling equilibrium as 
proposed by Bhattacharya and Heinkel (1982), Rennan and Kraus (1984). A signal is 
costly if the production of the signal consumes resource or if the signal is associated 
with a loss in welfare generated by deviations from allocation or distribution of claims 
in perfect markets. The signaling paradigm is multivariate for financial instruments. 
Poitevin (1989) demonstrates that debt could be used as a signal to differentiate the 
potential competition of new entrant firms. Low cost entrants signal this fact by   8
issuing debt while the incumbent or high cost entrants issue only equity; Harris and 
Raviv (1985) argue that calling firm’s convertibles can be a kind of signal and 
Bhattacharya and Dittmar (1991) show stock repurchase is another kind of signal to 
represent firm value. 
Finance Theory and Farm Businesses 
Although the pecking order theory has influential effects on finance capital 
structure, it is also criticized for its simplifying assumptions, where the firm’s only 
financing choice is debt vs. equity. The pecking order theory does not hold in more 
complicating settings in corporate finance, for example when the firm chooses 
between straight and convertible debts and there is an agency problem between 
shareholder and manager etc. However, farm businesses are immune to the 
complications discussed above. Farm businesses work with very simple external 
financing, debt and equity, farm operator is equity owner as well as manager. Farm 
businesses are exact background for testing the pecking order theory. 
The signaling theory talks about financing tactics, where good firms try to 
distinguish themselves from bad quality firms by using different financing device. 
Farm owners also have incentives to get external financing by adopting such 
financing strategies. Unlike corporate firms who offer signals (dividend or repurchase 
shares from stock market) to stock market, farm owners send signals to all potential 
lenders in agricultural capital market. The signal instruments for farm business can be 
its profitability, farm income, the historical good performance record (return on assets) 
farm leverage, risk management documentation, operating products etc.     9
Based on above theory implications, this paper tests pecking order theory as 
well as the signaling theory. We explore whether the pecking order theory and the 
signaling theory can be applied for farm businesses. 
   10
Model 
Under asymmetric financial markets, the pecking order theory and the signaling 
theory could be tested through combined relationships among a farm's cash flow, 
financial leverage and investments contemporaneously and intertemporally. We 
develop a simultaneous dynamic equation system, which is composed of three 
equations to integrate the two theories into empirical testing work. 
Cash Flow Equation 
An important econometric issue that needs to be addressed is that pecking order 
theory considers the financing deficit to be exogenous. Farms’ cash flow and leverage 
simultaneously affect each other and both are influenced by farms’ investments. 
When farms face a good investment opportunity, they first use cash, followed by debt, 
and last they will issue equity. Testing the contemporaneous relationship between 
cash flow and leverage will help to validate the pecking order theory. Meanwhile, the 
dynamic interaction between the previous investment, leverage and future cash flow 
would support the signaling theory. More promising farms can attain financial support 
by signaling their historical leverage and consequent positive cash flow record to 
lenders. The above spirit of the pecking order theory and signaling theory is in the 
cash flow equation. 
Equal (1) CFt= α1CFt-1+α2Lt+α3Lt-1+α4 INVt +α5 INVt-1+α6 ROAt +α7 ROAt-1+ut 
CFt represents cash flow at time period t.
 CFt-1 is lagged one period cash flow variable. 
Lt is farm total leverage (debt) at time t, while Lt-1 is the lagged leverage variable. 
ROA is farm’s return on assets, representing farm’s profitability. INVt and INVt-1 are   11
investment variables standing for current and lagged one period. ut  is  the  error  term.     
To test whether farm businesses follow the pecking order theory, we need to look at 
α2. Negative sign of the coefficient, at the same time period, demonstrates pecking 
order behavior holds for farm businesses. The signaling theory can be tested by 
considering relationships between previous investment (α5) and current cash flow as 
well as lagged debt variables (α3) and current cash flow. α3, α5 will appear to be 
positive according to the signaling idea. 
Leverage Equation 
Titman and Wessels (1988) suggests a positive relationship between size and 
leverage in the pecking order theory, by arguing that larger firms tended to be more 
diversified and failed less often, farm size is considered a proxy for information 
asymmetry between farms and capital markets. Since larger farms are more closely 
observed by lenders, they should convey more accurate credit risk information. 
Titman and Wessels measure firm size with the natural logarithm of net sales where 
the logarithmic transformation accounts for the conjecture that small firms are 
particularly affected by a size effect. To develop this specification, we measure the 
effect of farm size on farm leverage; we also consider the simultaneous relationship of 
leverage and cash flow suggested by the pecking order theory.   
The signaling application contained in leverage equation is that farms with sound 
management practices, indicated by their lagged cash flow to expanded debt capacity 
at lower costs. Based on inside information, good operating farms could signal a 
higher leverage or rich accumulated assets, which can not be sustained or reached by   12
low liquidity and low profitability farms. High quality farms are measured by lagged 
positive cash flow and high return on assets.   
Equal (2) Lt = β1CFt + β2CFt-1 + β3ROAt-1+ β4 INVt+ β5INVt-1+β6 LSIZEt+ vt   
Following Titman and Wessels, our measure of size is the natural logarithm of farm’s 
total assets, LSIZE
1. Lt is the farm’s total leverage. Pecking order relationship, in this 
equation, is reflected by contemporaneous interaction of farm’s leverage and cash 
flow (β1 should be negative). From the view of asymmetric information, pecking order 
theory also predicts a positive sign of Lsize (β6), showing larger farms are less 
information constrained and could be easily observed in capital market. Meanwhile, 
signaling theory suggests good performing farms use previous ample cash flow (β2) 
and profitability (return on assets ROAt-1, β3) as signals to attract capital institution and 
attain funds for their profitable projects. One character of farm business is that, for the 
same type business, larger farm size implies a more equity farm, which enables the 
scale of economy, thus could bear more endurance in depressive business circle. So, 
to some degree, size could also be used as financing signal. The positive sign of farm 
size (Lsize, β6) will co-represent the pecking order and the signaling theory. 
Investment Equation 
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) reinterpret the accelerator mechanism by 
emphasizing the asymmetric information in capital market. “Costs of external finance 
vary inversely with the level of “inside finance”, and there is a direct channel for 
                                                 
1  The logarithmic transformation serves to compress the magnitude of the size variable for the 
largest firms, with the goal of reducing possible heteroskedasticity and skewness resulting from 
such outliers.   13
internal funds to affect investment: when borrower’s net worth improves, lenders 
become more willing to lend, and additional investment can be financed.” Benefit 
from their study, we test the pecking order principle by considering the relationship 
among investment, internal cash flow and leverage. In addition, in a more complex 
view of pecking order theory offered by Myers (1984), firms are concerned with 
future as well as current financing costs. Balancing current and future cost, it is 
possible that firms with large expected investment maintain low-risk debt capacity to 
avoid either foregoing future investments or financing them with new risky securities. 
It is thus possible that, controlling for other effects, firms with larger expected 
investments have less current leverage. We synthesize their ideas into an investment 
equation. 
Equal (3) INVt = γ1CFt + γ2CFt-1 + γ3 Lt +γ4 Lt-1+γ5ROA+γ6 ROAt-1+ εt 
Equal (3) mainly tests the dynamic relationship between investment and lagged 
leverage for the pecking order theory. A negative sign for lagged leverage (γ4 < 0) is 
anticipated, which implies farmers keep a lower current debt level in order to 
accumulate financing capacity for future investments. At the same time, farm’s 
investment would devour current cash flow; γ1 should show a negative sign here. 
Similar logic holds in this equation for signaling theory. Farm owners depend on 
historical good cash flow (γ2) and return on asset (γ6) performance to reveal their 
quality priority, farm investment soon successfully financed by lenders in capital 
market. In this vein, γ2, γ6 should display positive sign to show well performing farms 
continually expand by making new investments.   14
Testing Hypothesis 
To summarize, the theoretical signification of pecking order theory is embodied 
by the contemporaneous relationship in the cash flow, leverage, and investment 
equations, while the implications of signaling are observed from the inter-temporal 
relationship between investment and lagged cash, cash flow and lagged leverage, and 
vice versa. To investigate the information signaling hypothesis and pecking order 
behavior, we make the null and alternative assumptions in Table1.   15
Data and Method 
Data  
The empirical analysis utilizes data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm 
Management (FBFM) system for farms that received continuous annual balance sheet 
certification during the 1995-2002 time periods. Our study focuses on sample farms 
with at least 2 years of continuous operation. A total of 1419 farms meet the criteria. 
Summary statistics for variables and other farm characteristics are reported in table 2. 
The variables discussed in table 2 are reflected in the following measures: Cash 
flow (CF) is the farm's total net cash provided by operating activities and investing 
activities. Net cash provided by operating activities is calculated as the sum of farm 
operating receipts (excluding breeding livestock) and net non-farm income less cash 
paid for operating expenses and paid for interest, operating market livestock and feed, 
family living, income and self-employment tax. Net cash from investing activities is 
the cash sale of breeding livestock, cash sale of machinery and equipment, and cash 
sale of buildings, securities, real estate, and investments/fund transfers less cash paid 
for breeding livestock, machinery and equipment, buildings, and cash paid for 
securities, real estate, and investments/fund transfers. Total leverage (L) is the sum of 
short term liabilities, intermediate liabilities and long term liabilities. Short-term debt 
is current liabilities plus intermediate liabilities. Current liabilities include short term 
operating notes, commodity credit Corp. loans, feed accounts payable/ASC, lease 
payment and accounts payable with merchants & dealers, estimated accrued tax 
liability accrued interest, due principle within twelve months of intermediate and long   16
term notes. Intermediate liabilities are the capital lease/deferred portion of 
intermediate notes and life insurance policy loans etc. Long term liabilities contains 
the real estate mortgages and contracts. Investment (INV) is mainly comprised of two 
parts, one is machinery and building purchases, the other is land purchase and 
improvements. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the return on market value 
assets. 
Method  
Equals are estimated through a dynamic simultaneous equation system, which is 
composed of cash flow equation, leverage equation and investment equation:   
Eq. (1) CFt= α1CFt-1+α2Lt+α3Lt-1+α4 INVt +α5 INVt-1+α6 ROAt +α7 ROAt-1+ut 
Eq. (2) Lt = β1CFt + β2CFt-1 + β3ROAt-1+ β4 INVt+ β5INVt-1+β6 LSIZEt+ vt 
Eq. (3) INVt = γ1CFt + γ2CFt-1 + γ3 Lt +γ4 Lt-1+γ5ROA+γ6 ROAt-1+ εt 
Each equation is jointly determined by other two equations. Endogenous 
variables in this simultaneous system are cash flow (CFt), leverage (Lt) and 
investment (INVt). Preceding estimation, we need to make sure that these variables are 
identifiable. In our dynamic model, (each equation contains a lagged one period 
variable) we have sets of predetermined variables. Such as lagged cash flow variable 
(CFt-1), lagged leverage (Lt-1), lagged investment variable (INVt-1) and return on assets 
variable (ROAt-1). These variables are obviously not exogenous, but with regard to 
current values of the endogenous variables, they can be regarded as having been 
determined. In this study, we also assume that farm’s return on asset is determined by 
industry characteristic exogenously and farm size has been determined at study time   17
period. So, the endogenous variables can be identified within the system. We use 
GMM approach to estimate our simultaneous equation system, which those lagged 
variable are used as instrumental variables. Furthermore, GMM approach will allow 
us to generalize the covariance structure for the disturbance.       
   18
Empirical Results 
Full Sample Results     
Our testing approach first estimates the model for the full sample farms that 
maintained at least 2 years of certified data. The model is then re-estimated based on a 
classification of the farms into different size and age groups. The 1995-2002 full 
sample coefficient estimates are reported in Table 3.   
For the cash flow equation, the negative significant coefficient of leverage shows 
cash flow and leverage are inversely related to each other (α2 = - 0.786***), which 
are consistent with the pecking order principle: farm operators first deplete cash, 
when they seek further development, they will issue debt as financial resource. The 
coefficient on the lagged leverage variable displays an insignificant relationship with 
cash flow (α3 = - 0.0003), suggesting we cannot come to the conclusion, in this 
equation, that leverage is used as signal for farms to get financing. 
Debt demonstrates the strongest and most robust relationship with cash flow. 
Thus, leverage equation offers obvious phenomena for pecking order behavior and 
signaling idea. We find a significant negative sign between cash flow and leverage 
(β1= - 0.829***), meaning if farm operators have more cash flow, they will borrow 
less money. This finding supports the contemporaneous pecking order hypothesis. 
Signaling theory is embodied in the relationship between leverage and the lagged cash 
flow (β2= 0.021**) and lagged return on assets (β3 = 0.0003**). This result is similar 
to the study by Ravid and Sarig (1991), who demonstrate firms use dividend and 
leverage as signal, our result shows farm businesses adopt cash flow and profitability   19
(ROAt-1) as a signal. The second equation also yields a positive relationship between 
leverage and farm size (measured by the natural logarithm of total farm assets 
β6=0.003**), which is consistent with the findings of Titman and Wessels (1988) who 
indicates that larger farms are less information constrained and perhaps survive 
economic depression. Consequently, they hold a dominant position for funding 
compared to small farms in pecking order theory. At the same time, it also implies the 
signaling idea, well performed farms tend to improve size (which can be another 
signal for farm businesses demonstrate their business strength), the accumulate equity 
can act as signal to attract lenders. 
In investment equation, we find farm investment decision is affected by its 
profitability (ROAt-1, γ6= 0.0009***) of last period. Even if farm face a negative cash 
flow of last period (CFt-1, γ2 = - 0.043***), the good investment opportunity (ROAt-1 
γ6= 0.0009***) still promotes farms make further investments. This also illustrates, 
from another perspective, that investments for farm businesses mainly depend on 
leverage. A negative contemporaneous relationship between investment and cash flow 
not necessarily means that farms invest more when cash flow are small, rather, this is 
because we calculate the net cash flow from operating activity plus investment 
activity. It is normal for farms’ investments to be greater than cash flow in hand, so 
the total net cash flow should be negative after farms make investments. This 
contemporaneously negative relation between farm’s investment and cash flow 
follows the pecking order principle. Although our testing supports the complex view   20
of    pecking order hypothesis proposed by Myers (1984) who report a negative 
relationship between lagged leverage (γ4 = - 0.014), it is not significant. 
Grouping Comparison 
Grouping criteria in corporate studies have included payment versus nonpayment 
of dividends and membership versus non-membership in the New York Stock 
Exchange. Hubbard also cited the use of distinct business periods (e.g., boom versus 
bust) as a potential criterion. Our grouping methods are determined in two ways. One 
is following Barry, Bierlen, and Sotomayor, we group farm operators under 45 and 
over 50 years of age based on level of difference in the degree of information 
constraint. The other grouping approach borrows the idea from Titman and Wessels 
(1988), regarding farm size as a proxy for information asymmetry. Models for the 
upper and lower one-third of the farms are estimated. The middle one third is omitted 
to obtain greater differences between different groups. 
According to theory, firms with greater asymmetric information problems should 
adhere more closely to the pecking order. To test what kind farms are more following 
the signaling theory is based on the assumption that well performed farms could like 
to send diverse signals to attract potential lenders in capital market, thus facilitate 
their financing. Comparison results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Comparing the old farmer and young farmer group in the cash flow equation of 
table 4, the absolute value of the leverage coefficient for young operators (α2-young = 
-0.825***, α2-old = - 0.701***) are larger than that of old operators, suggesting young 
farmers are more information constrained as they more closely follow the pecking   21
order theory. The lagged leverage and future cash flow have a insignificant 
relationship for old farmers and young farmers, this shows that there is no clear 
pattern of signaling implication for both old and young farmers for choosing leverage 
as a signal for financing (α3-young = 0.01016, α3-old = - 0.00331). Comparison between 
small and large farms in cash flow equation demonstrates that smaller farms are, at 
the same degree, following the pecking order theory as large farms, while larger farms 
tend to more closely follow the signaling theory. The leverage coefficients for small 
farms have almost equal impact on cash flow as larger farms (α2-small = - 0.796***, 
α2-large = - 0.806***), but larger farms prefer to adopt positive profitability from 
previous period as a signal to convince lenders, attaining financial support, and realize 
future income (α7-small = - 0.0002, α7-large = - 0.00047**). 
In the leverage equation of table 5, larger farms’ previous cash flow and 
profitability have greater impacts on their leverage (the coefficients of lagged cash 
flow and return on assets β2-large= 0.05369***, β3-large= 0.00064***, for larger farm 
and β2-small = 0.01692, β3-small = 0.00023* for smaller farms). As the signaling theory 
predicted, the leverage level for smaller farms is especially affected by their size 
compare to larger farms (β6-small= 0.00749**, β6-large= 0.00537**) and old farmers also 
tend to depend on size as well as higher profitability as signals to seek for financing 
(β3-young= 0.0002889*,β3-old= 0.0002938*,β6-young= 0.00199, β6-old=0.00698***). This 
finding is consistent with Poitevin’s study (1989) that the incumbent business has 
advantage to get financial support depending on longer well developed relationship 
with financial institutions. This mechanism works same way for old farmers, the long   22
run cooperative relationship between old farmers and their lenders enable them more 
easily access loan and finance their farm business. Table 5 also obviously 
demonstrates that small farms and young farmers are more following the pecking 
theory compare to large farms and old farm operators (β1-small=-0.847***, β1-large= 
-0.777***, β1-young= - 0.833***, β1-old= - 0.768***) which is reflected through the 
relationship between simultaneous relationship of cash flow and leverage. 
Conclusions and suggestions 
Our study results demonstrate significant support for the applicability of both the 
pecking order theory and signaling theory for farm businesses. However, unlike 
corporate firms which can use leverage as signal to facilitate their financing, potential 
lenders for farm businesses more prefer to issue loans to farms with larger size, good 
historical record of income as well as high profitability.   
Our comparison results from age group show those young farm operators apt to 
more track the pecking order theory while old farmers are more following the 
signaling theory. Grouping by farm size suggests that smaller farms are more closely 
following the pecking order and that their leverage position is sensitive to a change in 
size. Larger farms with greater total assets also flow the financing order suggested by 
the pecking order theory, in addition, they also have incentives to adopt signal 
financial strategies during their development.   23
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Table1. Null and Alternative Hypotheses for Testing the Pecking Order versus Signaling Theory 
Pecking Order Theory  Signaling Theory 
CFt= α1CFt-1+α2Lt+α3Lt-1+α4 INVt +α5 INVt-1+α6 ROAt +α7 ROAt-1+ut 
Hpo: α2= 0   
Hpa: α2≠ 0   
The negative sign of α2 suggests farms following the pecking 
order theory; otherwise, there is no pecking order behavior.   
Hso: α3=0 α5 =0 and α7=0 
Hsa: α3≠0 α5 ≠0 and α7≠0 
The signaling theory is expressed dynamically in cash flow and 
lagged term of leverage term. If α3 α5 and α7 all show a positive 
sign, farms’ signaling behavior is confirmed.   
Lt = β1CFt + β2CFt-1 + β3ROAt-1+ β4 INVt+ β5INVt-1+β6 LSIZEt+ vt 
Hpo: β1 =0 β6=0 
Hpa: β1 ≠0 β6≠0 
If farms follow the pecking order theory, we should get β1 <0, 
which means cash flow and leverage at the same term have a 
negative relationship. Because of asymmetric information, β6>0 
shows larger farms are less information constrained and they are 
easier to attain financial support. 
Hso: β2 =0 β3=0 β6=0 
Hsa: β2 ≠ 0 β3 ≠ 0 β6≠0 
Generally, farms with good cash flow performance could 
undertake higher financial leverage. Otherwise, continuously 
issuing debt probably leads farms to bankruptcy. We expect β2 β3 
β6 showing positive signs. 
INVt = γ1CFt + γ2CFt-1 + γ3 Lt +γ4 Lt-1+γ5ROA+γ6 ROAt-1+ εt 
Hpo: γ1=0 γ4=0 
Hpa: γ1≠0 γ4≠0 
If Hpo is rejected, the significant negative coefficients γ1<0, 
γ4<0, would be consistent with pecking order behavior. 
Hso: γ2=0 γ6=0  
Hsa: γ2≠0 γ6≠0  
The significant positive coefficients here (γ2, γ6) would be 
consistent with the implications of the signaling theory. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for sample farm characteristics 
Mean Std  Dev  Minimum Maximum  Variable 
Total Net cash flow ($)  -17,048 90,066  -1,639,186 569,761 
Net short term debt ($)  7,532  59,197  -651,344  647,483 
Net long term debt ($)  7,408  69,196  -513,155  1,737,866 
Debt/Asset  ratio  0.34 0.21 0.00 2.41 
Total Investment ($)  26,892  40,438  0.00  984,509 
Total Assets ($)  1,114, 283 835,561  59,738  9,988,631 
Return on Assets (%)  4.89  7.56  -47.53  81.08 
Age of Operator  48.73  10.54  19  97 
Note: Dollar amounts are in current dollars. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for the Simultaneous Equation System   
 
CFt= α1CFt-1+α2 Lt +α3Lt-1+α4INVt +α5 INVt-1+α6 ROAt +α7 ROAt-1+ut 
Lt = β1CFt + β2CFt-1 + β3ROAt-1+ β4 INVt+ β5INVt-1+β6 LSIZEt+ vt 
INVt = γ1CFt + γ2CFt-1 + γ3 Lt +γ4 Lt-1+γ5ROA+γ6 ROAt-1+ εt 
 
Equal (1)  Coef.  St.D.  Equal (2)  Coef.  St.D.  Equal (3)  Coef.  St.D. 
CFt-1  0.0225 0.0159  CFt  -0.829*** 0.010  CFt  - 0.153*** 0.013 
Lt  -0.786*** 0.0096  CFt-1  0.021** 0.010  CFt-1  -0.043*** 0.012 
Lt-1  -0.0003 0.0145 ROAt-1  0.0003*** 0.00009  Lt  0.037** 0.013 
INVt  -0.233*** 0.0208  INVt  0.059**  0.022  Lt-1  -0.014  0.012 
INVt-1  -0.0031 0.0197  INVt-1  0.009  0.021  ROA  -0.0004*** 0.00009 
ROAt  0.00084*** 0.0001  LSIZEt  0.003** 0.001  ROAt-1  0.0009*** 0.00008 
ROAt-1  -0.00008 0.0001            
Adj. R-Square = 0.7136 
No. of farms = 1419 
Adj. R-Square = 0.6985 
No. of farms = 1419 
Adj. R-Square = 0.1965 
No. of farms = 1419 
*, **, *** statistical significance at the10% 5% and 1% level based on two tailed tests     31 
Table 4. Estimated Coefficients of Cash Flow Equation between Two Group Farms    
 
       C F t= α1CFt-1+α2Lt +α3Lt-1+α4INVt +α5 INVt-1+α6 ROAt +α7 ROAt-1+ut 
 
Variables  Small Farms  Large Farms  Young Operator  Old Operator 
CFt-1  0.03446 -0.00478  0.0283  0.04046 
  (0.02513) (0.0268) (0.02638)  (0.02715) 
Lt  -0.796***  -0.8064*** -0.8247*** -0.7014***   
  (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0158)  (0.01701) 
Lt-1  0.00596 -0.02197 0.01016 -0.00331 
  (0.02218) (0.02624) (0.02438) (0.02432) 
INVt  -0.199***  -0.3239*** -0.2391*** -0.2719***   
  (0.03041) (0.04686) (0.03646) (0.04073) 
INVt-1  -0.01561 0.00377 -0.00039 -0.04272 
  (0.02868)  (0.04462) (0.034) (0.03899) 
ROAt  0.0009*** 0.0004*  0.00088***  0.0006***   
  (0.00015) (0.000247)  (0.000186)  (0.0002) 
ROAt-1  -0.0002 0.00047**  -0.00009 -0.00006 
  (0.00014) (0.00023) (0.00017) (0.00018) 
No  of  farms  801 562 699 670 
Adj  R-Sqare  73.66% 67.96% 74.42% 59.14% 
         *,  **,  ***  statistical  significance  at the10% 5% and 1% level based on two tailed tests. 
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Table 5. Estimated Coefficients of Leverage Equation between Two Group Farms 
 
Lt = β1CFt + β2CFt-1 + β3ROAt-1+ β4 INVt+ β5INVt-1+β6 LSIZEt+ vt 
 
Lt Eq.  Small Farms  Large Farms  Young Operator  Old Operator 
CFt  -0.84659*** -0.77717*** -0.8327***  -0.76756*** 
  (0.01589) (0.01711)  (0.01606)  (0.01854) 
CFt-1  0.01692 0.05369***  -0.01913  0.05987*** 
  (0.01564) (0.01804)  (0.01534)  (0.01954) 
ROAt-1  0.00023* 0.00064***  0.000289*  0.000294* 
  (0.00013) (0.0002)  (0.000158)  (0.000167) 
INVt  0.06704** 0.03872 0.03283  0.06109 
  (0.032) (0.04692)  (0.0375)  (0.04308) 
INVt-1  -0.01458 0.03834  0.01444  -0.00712 
  (0.02981) (0.04391)  (0.03441)  (0.04083) 
LSIZEt  0.00749** 0.00537** 0.00199  0.00698*** 
  (0.0033) (0.00272)  (0.00223)  (0.00147) 
No of farms  801  562  699  670 
Adj R-Sq  72.20%  67.01%  72.90%  57.93% 
*, **, *** statistical significance at the10% 5% and 1% level based on two tailed tests. 